Why Kirkuk Become Epicenter of Iraq's Local Elections Now?
Intra-Kurdish Rivalry Threatens to Reshape Iraq's Political Landscape
The city of Kirkuk is no stranger to turmoil and division, but yesterday, it became the epicenter of a growing intra-Kurdish rivalry threatening to destabilize this ethnically diverse region further. As the province prepares for its first provincial elections in a decade, tensions have reached a boiling point, with Kurdish factions, primarily the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), vying for power and influence.
The clash between protesters, predominantly Kurds and Arabs, as well as Turkomen residents and security forces, erupted violently, resulting in the tragic deaths of three Kurdish protestors and leaving several others injured. This violent incident underscores the deep-seated divisions within the region and raises questions about the potential impact of these rivalries on the upcoming elections.
What makes this election particularly intriguing is the fierce competition among Kurdish factions, especially the PUK and KDP, two historically dominant parties in the Kurdish political landscape. The PUK has formed a coalition with smaller Kurdish parties, while the KDP has forged alliances with the Iraqi Islamic Party, Turkomen factions, and some other lesser-known Kurdish groups. This election is no longer a contest between Kurds, Arabs, or Turkmen but rather a power struggle among leading Kurdish factions.
The Kirkuk provincial council will have 15 seats, including one quota for Christians. Kurdish parties are expected to secure between 7 to 9 seats, further divided among four Kurdish factions. Arab residents, on the other hand, are divided into three major alliances. However, the real battleground is between the PUK and KDP, the Talabanis and Barzanis.
This is part of the new era of PUK-KDP relations and a new balance of power. Prime Minister Masrour Barzani, since assuming power, has pursued a reconfiguration of the Kurdistan Regional Government's (KRG) structure, moving away from the "strategic agreement" era that evenly divided KRG positions between the PUK and KDP. This agreement was initially struck when both parties were equally powerful, dominating Kurdistan and Iraqi parliamentary seats. However, the balance of power has shifted significantly in favor of the KDP in Baghdad and Erbil.
In the 2018 Kurdistan Parliament elections, the KDP won 44 seats out of 111, while the PUK secured only 18 seats. In the 2021 Iraqi Parliament elections, the KDP won 32 seats, while the PUK barely won 18 seats. This divide deepened Iraq's government formation process, leading to a deadlock. Similar results are expected in Kirkuk if the elections proceed as planned in December. The KDP has skillfully exploited the PUK's internal divisions and sown sectarian discord during disputes involving Kurdish and Arab-led local governments, such as the issue of Kurdish farmers. Since there is no significant Kurdish opposition party to challenge both parties, the tensions are expected to rise, but this time in Kirkuk.
Traditionally, the PUK was the dominant Kurdish party in Kirkuk. However, in the 2021 elections, the PUK secured only four seats out of 12, with the KDP winning two and the New Generation Party winning one. The KDP now sees an opportunity to either secure a majority in Kirkuk or block the PUK's dominance in the council by forming alliances with Arab factions and Turkomen, effectively sidelining the PUK.
The tension in Kirkuk has been exacerbated by the return of the KDP, whose headquarters in the city and other disputed territories have been occupied by the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), or Iraqi security forces. However, the KDP struck a deal with the State Administration Coalition in Iraq, the coalition that formed the current Iraqi government, to hand over these headquarters to the KDP, but strategic delays have turned it into a campaign issue for the KDP. The decision to allow the KDP to reclaim its headquarters in Kirkuk triggered a backlash from some Arab and Turkomen residents, who initiated demonstrations.
The PUK's intelligence agencies suspect that these demonstrations were orchestrated in collaboration with the KDP to bolster its election campaign. KDP media outlets have portrayed the situation as Arabs, Turkomen, and PMU, “fearing the KDP as the sole defender of Kurds.” The PUK, although still present in Kirkuk since the events of 2017, has seen its influence wane in the local government.
Following the recent demonstrations and the tragic loss of life, the PUK and KDP have adopted divergent positions. The PUK accuses the KDP of stoking sectarian tensions for political gain, while KDP leaders, including Masoud Barzani, characterize the tensions as an “unacceptable” attack on Kurds in Kirkuk.
Although intra-Kurdish rivalry takes center stage in the Kirkuk elections, it is essential to recognize that both Arab and Turkomen parties are not mere bystanders but actively involved, directly or indirectly. Some of these parties have framed their campaigns as anti-Kurdish or rejecting "Kurdish Return" to the local government. Much like the PUK and KDP, they navigate the turbulent waters of identity politics, adding further complexity to the already multifaceted electoral landscape. This intertwining of ethnic and political dynamics underscores the high stakes and volatility of the upcoming elections in Kirkuk.
As Kirkuk braces for the upcoming provincial elections, the city finds itself at a crossroads, torn between rival Kurdish factions and simmering ethnic tensions. The outcome of these elections will not only shape the province's political landscape but may also have far-reaching implications for the stability of the broader region. As Iraq moves towards a new era, Kirkuk's multi-ethnic environment remains a complex puzzle with no easy solutions; adding intra-Kurdish rivalry will make things worse.